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Everettian Quantum Mechanics 
Without Branching Time 
Alastair Wilson 
Monash University 
ABSTRACT: 
In this paper I assess the prospects for combining contemporary 
Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) with branching-time semantics in 
the tradition of Kripke, Prior, Thomason and Belnap. I begin by 
outlining the salient features of ‘decoherence-based’ EQM, and of the 
’consistent histories’ formalism that is particularly apt for conceptual 
discussions in EQM. This formalism permits of both ‘branching worlds’ 
and ‘parallel worlds’ interpretations; the metaphysics of EQM is in this 
sense underdetermined by the physics. A prominent argument due to 
David Lewis [1986] supports the non-branching interpretation. Belnap et 
al. [2001] refer to Lewis’ argument as the ’Assertion problem’, and 
propose a pragmatic response to it. I argue that their response is 
unattractively ad hoc and complex, and that it prevents an Everettian 
who adopts branching-time semantics from making clear sense of 
objective probability. The upshot is that Everettians are better off 
without branching-time semantics. I conclude by discussing and rejecting 
an alternative possible motivation for branching time.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the last twenty years, Everettian quantum mechanics (for short: 
EQM) has been steadily gaining in popularity both amongst physicists and 
amongst philosophers. Its principal appeal derives from its status as the most 
conservative realist response to the quantum measurement problem. It is also 
presupposed by almost all contemporary work in quantum cosmology. 
 
A variety of metaphors have been used to explicate EQM. Everett 
himself referred to ‘splitting’ of worlds. Others have preferred to talk of 
‘branching worlds’, or of ‘parallel worlds’, or of ‘relativity of value-definiteness’. 
The ‘branching’ metaphor has perhaps been the most prominent; and so it is not 
surprising that EQM has frequently been associated with branching-time 
semantics, of the sort invented by Kripke and Prior and advocated, in different 
ways, by Belnap, Thomason, McCall, Placek, Müller and others. What could be 
more appropriate for a branching ontology than a branching semantics? 
 
Authors who recommend branching-time semantics to the Everettian 
include David Wallace1 (Wallace [2005]), Nuel Belnap and Thomas Müller 
(Belnap & Müller [2010]). But adopting branching-time semantics is not 
compulsory for Everettians. And in fact the rationale for doing so, on closer 
inspection, looks decidedly murky. In this paper I argue that Everettians can and 
should steer clear of branching-time semantics. 
 
I begin in section 2 with a short introduction to the salient features of 
EQM, and in particular to the version of EQM associated with the ‘Oxford 
Everettians’ – David Deutsch, Simon Saunders, David Wallace and Hilary 
Greaves. The ‘consistent histories’ formalism that is particularly apt for 
conceptual discussions in EQM is briefly set out in section 3. I argue in section 4 
that it permits of both branching and non-branching interpretations: the 
metaphysics of EQM is in this sense underdetermined by the physics. A 
prominent argument from the metaphysics literature, due to David Lewis, 
supports the use of the non-branching interpretation. Belnap et al. [2001] refer to 
this argument as the ‘Assertion problem’ and propose a pragmatic solution to it. 
In section 5 I raise some objections to this response, and in section 6 I argue that 
the problem Lewis highlights prevents Everettians who adopt branching-time 
semantics from making any making clear sense of objective probability. The 
upshot is that Everettians are better off without branching-time semantics. 
Section 7 discusses and rejects an alternative way of motivating branching-time 
semantics; section 8 is a conclusion. 
                                            
1  It should be noted that Wallace is elsewhere neutral regarding branching-time 
semantics. 
3 
 
2. Decoherence-based Everettian Quantum Mechanics  
The basic idea behind EQM will be familiar to most readers. The theory 
was conceived in response to the quantum measurement problem: although 
transition probabilities calculated using the mathematical apparatus of quantum 
mechanics provide astonishingly accurate matches to the statistical results of 
experiments, the procedure actually used by physicists when applying the 
formalism (call it the quantum algorithm) makes essential use of the operational 
concept of a measurement. Everett’s central idea (Everett [1955]) was that when 
observers are modelled correctly within the theory, as fully quantum systems, it 
will turn out that from the perspective of an observer the quantum algorithm is 
a reliable way to make predictions. The success of the quantum algorithm is thus 
explained perspectivally; no extra fundamental structure must be added to 
quantum theory to make sense of our observations. Or so it is claimed. 
 
Although Everett himself never acknowledged it, a difficulty known as 
the preferred basis problem has loomed large in subsequent work on EQM. 
Everett’s formulation of the theory presupposed a preferred decomposition of the 
wavefunction – essentially, a specification of a set of physically ‘special’ 
observable quantities – which seems to be unwarranted by the quantum 
formalism, which runs contrary to the spirit of the theory, and which 
undermines its claim to Lorentz covariance. An approach to quantum mechanics 
which needs to stipulate a preferred basis (or ‘interpretation basis’ as it was 
dubbed by Deutsch [1985]) is not the clean and conservative solution to the 
measurement problem that Everett seems to have thought it was. 
 
EQM suffered for a time from the perception, encouraged by many of its 
advocates, that some additional ingredient had to be added to the theory to 
make it coherent. The most significant step towards a plausible version of EQM 
came when, in the early 1990s, progress in technical work on decoherence was 
applied to the preferred basis problem. Decoherence theory is a way of modelling 
the quantum-mechanical interactions between a system and its environment; 
Zurek [2003] gives an accessible introduction. All quantum systems rapidly 
become entangled with their environment; in decoherence models, this is 
represented by the rapid diminishing of the coefficients of the cross-diagonal, or 
‘interference’ terms. Everettians interpret this effect as the suppression of 
interactions between components of the state of the system which correspond to 
distinct macroscopic states of affairs. This suppression happens extremely 
quickly; simple models have it occurring at the order of 10-20 s (Zurek [2003]). 
 
 The environment-induced suppression of interference described by 
decoherence was first applied to the preferred basis problem by Simon Saunders 
(Saunders [1993], [1995]). The idea is that a preferred basis is approximately 
selected by decoherence, to a degree of approximation easily high enough to 
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explain the fact that superpositions of macroscopic states are unobserved and (at 
least for all practical purposes) unobservable. If we consider some individual 
component (in the decoherence basis) of the state, and focus on its forwards 
time-evolution, then the other components of the state have a negligible 
influence; it makes no significant difference to our calculated transition 
probabilities whether we consider the other components. 
 
Wallace [2012] gives a comprehensive statement and a sustained defence 
of a decoherence-only version of EQM. Although it remains controversial 
whether decoherence is sufficient to resolve the preferred basis problem, there is 
a growing consensus that the success of EQM depends on it; ‘many worlds’ or 
‘many minds’ theories which posited additional fundamental structure would not 
be worth the price. In this paper I will be assuming a decoherence-only version of 
EQM. 
 
One of the most interesting features of the multiverse which emerges 
from decoherence is that it is approximately defined. In particular, there is a 
sense in which individual histories are indeterminate in number. Here is how 
Wallace puts the point2:  
 
There is no sense in which [chaotic] phenomena lead to a naturally 
discrete branching process: ... while a branching structure can be 
discerned in such systems it has no natural “grain”. To be sure, by 
choosing a certain discretisation of (configuration-)space and time, a 
discrete branching structure will emerge, but a finer or coarser choice 
would also give branching. And there is no “finest” choice of branching 
structure: as we fine-grain our decoherent history space, we will 
eventually reach a point where interference between branches ceases to 
be negligible, but there is no precise point where this occurs. As such, 
the question “how many branches are there?” does not, ultimately, 
make sense.  
Wallace [2010] p.67-68 
 
Advocates of EQM use a variety of terminology to express this aspect of the 
theory: ascriptions of history number are ‘interest-relative’ (Saunders [1998] 
p.313), are ‘arbitrary conventions’ (Saunders [2010] p.12), are subject to ‘some 
indeterminacy’ (Wallace [2010] p.68), are ‘not well-defined’ (Greaves [2004] or 
‘[presuppose] the existence of a piece of structure which is not in fact present in 
the theory’ (Greaves [2007]). However we choose to express it, such imprecision 
has not generally been allowed for within proposed systems of branching-time 
                                            
2 Wallace’s terminology in this quote differs from my own usage, which I clarify in  
section 4 below. By ‘branches’ Wallace means those entities represented by 
decoherent consistent histories; and by ‘branching’ he means the process by which 
multiplicity of histories emerges. 
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semantics; and we might wonder whether this leads to complications in 
combining such systems with EQM. I will not, however, press this concern any 
further here. 
 
 The preferred basis problem concerns ontology. The other major 
difficulty faced by EQM concerns probability; it can be factored into three 
components. 
• The Incoherence problem: what does objective probability consist in, 
according to Everettian quantum mechanics? 
• The Quantitative problem: why should objective probability be 
given by the Born rule, according to Everettian quantum 
mechanics? 
• The Epistemic problem: why is our statistical evidence evidence for 
quantum mechanics, according to Everettian quantum mechanics? 
 
Although the latter two problems are somewhat incidental to the concerns 
of this paper, the Incoherence problem will play a central role in the argument. 
Branching-time semantics treats sentences about the future as incomplete: they 
are only assigned truth-values relative to particular histories. But probabilities 
are fundamentally probabilities of propositions, and in order to attach a 
probability to a future outcome we need to be able to make sense of the 
unrelativized proposition that the outcome will occur. Branching-time semantics 
does not allow us to do so. 
 
Branching-time theorists have typically been concerned to account for 
qualitative modality, rather than for quantitative modality3, so the problem with 
probability has mostly lurked in the background. But in the Everettian case, 
probability takes centre stage, and the status of propositions about the future 
has been central to recent discussions. In section 6 I will argue that Everettians 
should reject branching-time semantics as part of a solution to the probability 
problem. Before that, some more setup is needed. The next two sections present 
a particularly convenient formalism for EQM, and discuss what metaphysical 
interpretation it should be given. 
3. Consistent Histories 
 The consistent histories formalism, developed in the 1980s by Griffiths, 
Omnes, Gell-Mann and Hartle, will be useful for framing the metaphysical 
questions I want to pursue. This formalism describes quantum processes in terms 
of the Heisenberg picture: the quantum state is represented as constant, with 
                                            
3 There are, of course, exceptions. See e.g. Muller [2005] and Weiner & Belnap 
[2006]. Belnap (personal communication) is hopeful that branching space-time 
models may be able to accommodate probabilities in a way in which branching time 
models cannot. 
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operators representing observable quantities evolving over time. (This contrasts 
with the Schrödinger picture, according to which the operators are time-
invariant while the state – the wavefunction – evolves over time.) The 
Heisenberg picture allows quantum theory to be cast in the familiar and 
convenient Hamiltonian form; but the two pictures give the same expectation 
values for all observables, so the choice between them is usually regarded as 
having no physical or metaphysical significance. 
 In the consistent histories formalism, then, the set of possible 
alternatives for the state of any system at a time are represented by a set of 
orthogonal projection operators P෡஑, summing to unity; a so-called ‘resolution of 
the identity’:  
P෡஑P෡ஒ ൌ δ஑ஒ P෡஑ 
෍ P෡஑
஑
ൌ 1 
These two conditions ensure that the projection operators P෡஑ represent an 
exclusive and exhaustive set of propositions, which partition the possible states 
of a system at a time. This is to say that the propositions they represent are 
pair-wise incompatible, and that for every possible state of the system there is a 
corresponding proposition. Such a partition is called a coarse-graining. 
 
 Time is likewise modelled as discrete. Given a sequence of times t1 ¡ ... ¡ 
tn, the time-dependent projection operators P෡஑,୬ (tn) are related to the P෡஑ as 
follows:  
P෡஑౤ሺt୬ሻ ൌ ݁
୧Hሺ୲౤ି୲బሻ P෡஑౤݁
ି୧Hሺ୲౤ି୲బሻ  
 
(where H is the Hamiltonian of the system, tn labels the time, α labels the 
history, and t0 < t1 < ... <  tn-1, < tn). 
 
 Quantum histories are time-ordered sequences of time-dependent 
projection operators:  
C஑ ൌ P෡஑౤ሺt୬ሻ P෡஑౤షభሺt୬ିଵሻ … P෡஑బሺt଴ሻ 
 
Since each P෡஑ corresponds to a proposition about the system, a history attributes 
some property to the system at each time tn. 
 
 From an appropriate set S of projection operators, which is a resolution 
of the identity, we can generate a complete set of histories, as follows: 
 
C = — P෡஑భ  (t1) , P෡஑మ  (t2) ... P෡஑౤  (tn) ˝  where P෡஑ౡ belongs to S. 
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The set of histories C represents all possible time-ordered sequences of 
states for the system.  
 
 Not all such sets of histories are on a par. The requirement of 
decoherence, of effective independence of the histories from one another, can be 
expressed in the medium decoherence condition4. A set C obeys medium 
decoherence if for any histories C஑, C஑ᇱ in C (where ρ is a density operator 
representing the initial quantum state of the universe, and Tr is the matrix trace 
operation): 
TrሺC஑ρCற஑ᇱሻ ൎ TrሺC஑ρCற஑ሻδ஑ ஑ᇱ 
 
 A set of histories C which obeys the medium decoherence condition is 
called a decoherent history space. If we use a partition of projection operators 
corresponding to centre-of-mass variables of massive particles weakly coupled to 
a large number of much lighter particles, then the histories in the space are 
approximately classical in nature. Such history spaces are called quasi-classical 
realms. 
 
 As I have set it out here, the consistent histories framework is non-
relativistic, but this is not a problem of principle. Instead of using the non-
relativistic projection operators described above, we can work in terms of a basis 
corresponding to field values; probabilities and the consistency conditions can 
then be specified in terms of path integrals. For further details, see Gell-Mann & 
Hartle [1990]. 
4. Overlap and Divergence 
 The characteristic claim of EQM is that the quantum formalism 
describes a genuinely existing multiplicity. What it describes a multiplicity of is 
disputed; this will be discussed in more detail below. But we need to get clear on 
some terminology straight away. I will refer to the entities represented by 
consistent histories as Everett worlds, or just as worlds where context allows. 
 
‘World’ is often used interchangeably with ‘branch’ in discussions of 
EQM, but I prefer the former term since it avoids the risk of pre-judging the 
metaphysical questions addressed in this paper. I will not be presupposing that 
worlds overlap one another, in the sense of having parts in common at some time 
but not at another. To mark the difference between views which embrace part-
sharing of worlds and those which do not, I will adopt David Lewis’ distinction5 
between overlap and divergence. Overlapping worlds have initial segments in 
                                            
4 This terminology was introduced by Gell-Mann and Hartle [1990]. 
5 See Lewis [1986] p.206-7. 
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common; diverging worlds have distinct but qualitatively identical initial 
segments. 
 
 The thought that EQM might be well modelled by branching-time 
semantics rests on the assumption that Everett worlds overlap one another. This 
interpretation is widespread, but recent work on EQM has begun to call it into 
question. Nothing in the formalism of quantum mechanics compels us to think of 
consistent histories as representing branching entities rather than as representing 
diverging entities. Consider a set C of histories which satisfy medium 
decoherence. It will include the following histories: 
ܥఈ ൌ ෠ܲఈ೙ሺݐ௡଴ሻ ෠ܲఈ೙షభሺݐ௡ିଵሻ … ෠ܲఈభሺݐଵሻ ෠ܲఈబሺݐ଴ሻ 
ܥఈᇱ ൌ ෠ܲఈᇱ೙ሺݐ௡ሻ ෠ܲఈᇱ೙షభሺݐ௡ିଵሻ … ෠ܲఈᇱభሺݐଵሻ ෠ܲఈᇱబሺݐ଴ሻ 
 
Let α’k = αk for all k except k=n. Then the two histories are exactly similar 
up to and including the penultimate projection operator, but differ on the final 
projection operator – they agree at all times up to ݐ௡ିଵ, but differ at ݐ௡. The 
point at issue between the diverging and branching interpretations is whether 
the entities represented by the projection operators ෠ܲఈబ ... ෠ܲఈ೙షభ in ܥఈ are 
numerically identical to the entities represented by the projection operators ෠ܲఈᇱబ 
... ෠ܲఈᇱ೙షభ  in ܥఈᇱ, or whether they are (numerically distinct) qualitative duplicates. 
Numerically identical entities give us overlapping worlds; qualitative duplicates 
give us diverging worlds.  
 
 Some more terminology from metaphysics may be helpful here. 
According to the overlapping conception, projection operators represent token 
property-instantiations. Some particular instantiation of some particular 
property is then a part of many worlds, since individual projection operators 
appear in many different sequences of projection operators. According to the 
diverging conception, in contrast, projection operators represent types of 
property-instantiation6. Thus when some projection operator appears in multiple 
sequences of projection operators, what this entails is that the property-
instantiations in the worlds represented by these sequences are of the same type, 
and not that there is really only one property-instantiation which is common to 
each world. 
 
Although Saunders and Wallace have in previous work (e.g. Saunders & 
Wallace [2008]) tacitly assumed an overlapping structure of worlds, Saunders no 
                                            
6 This is a natural way to construe the consistent histories formalism as 
representing a diverging ontology, but it is not the only way. For example, it is 
consistent with divergence that a projection operator might represent some property 
instantiations in an irreducibly plural manner; nominalists may find this latter 
picture more attractive. Of course, those with anti-metaphysical tendencies will see 
no real distinction here. Thanks to Laurie Paul for discussion. 
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longer sees this assumption as forced on us by the quantum formalism (Saunders 
[2010]). I agree with him that the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics 
does not itself decide between overlap and divergence. Nor, as far as I can see, 
does any aspect of physicists’ own practice in applying the formalism. The 
type/token distinction is often elided in non-metaphysical contexts; and since the 
choice between overlap and divergence depends on whether we interpret 
projection operators as representing token property instantiations or as 
representing types of property-instantiation, any indecision over the token/type 
distinction generates a corresponding indecision over the overlap/divergence 
distinction. 
 
 While the choice between overlap and divergence has not been 
considered in any detail by physicists, philosophers of physics at least have paid 
it some attention. Saunders [1998] distinguished between fatalism, the view that 
the property-instantiations represented by ෠ܲఈబ ... ෠ܲఈ೙షభ  in ܥఈ are qualitatively 
identical but not numerically identical to the property-instantiations represented 
by the projection operators ෠ܲఈᇱబ ... ෠ܲఈᇱ೙షభ  in ܥఈᇱ, and minimalism, the view that 
these sets of property-instantiations are both qualitatively and numerically 
identical7. 
 
 It is easy to see why Saunders chose the names he did for these views. 
Taking the entities represented by the same projection operator as it appears in 
distinct histories to be numerically identical reduces the number of distinct 
entities we must acknowledge to a minimum. In contrast, taking the entities 
represented by different instances of same projection operator to be qualitatively 
identical but numerically distinct entails that no entity is part of more than one 
universe; thus once we have fixed which entity we are referring to, we have 
thereby picked out an entire history, and the future is in some sense ‘fixed’. 
However, I think that the terms ‘minimalism’ and ‘fatalism’ are unhelpfully 
value-laden; and if Everettians combine a diverging interpretation of EQM with 
a Lewis-style counterpart-theoretic account of de re modal claims, no unsettling 
fatalistic consequences in fact need follow.  For these reasons, I will stick with 
the Lewisian terminology of ‘overlap’ and ‘divergence’.  
 
 The diverging version of EQM has a certain similarity to the proposal of 
Deutsch [1985]. Deutsch posited a continuously infinite set of universes 
corresponding to each Everett world, and interpreted objective probability in 
terms of our ignorance about our location amongst these universes. Like the 
worlds of diverging EQM, Deutsch’s universes have no parts in common with one 
                                            
7 More recently, Saunders has had a change of mind, and no longer gives much 
weight to the consideration he previously adduced against divergence; namely, that 
divergence is better suited to model an incoherent mixture of worlds rather than a 
superposition of worlds.  See section 6 for more discussion. 
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another, but they do have qualitatively identical initial segments. The crucial 
difference between diverging EQM and Deutsch’s proposal is in the way in which 
the parallel-worlds ontology is grounded. In Deutsch’s proposal, the diverging 
picture arises from directly modifying the fundamental ontology of the theory. In 
the diverging version of EQM set out here, the diverging metaphysic arises from 
the interpretation of projection operators as representing types of property-
instantiation rather than as representing token property-instantiations. Thus the 
proposal involves a distinctive way of aligning the physics of consistent histories 
with the metaphysics of macroscopic worlds.  
 
 To show that a diverging reading of the consistent histories formalism is 
possible is not yet to show that it is desirable. In the next section, I consider an 
influential argument from the metaphysics literature which tells in favour of 
divergence. 
5. The ‘Assertion Problem’ 
In his On the Plurality of Worlds (Lewis [1986]), David Lewis advocated 
modal realism, the thesis that alternative possible worlds exist and are of a kind 
with the actual world. One of the first decisions that a modal realist faces is 
whether to endorse overlap or divergence in the case of indeterministic worlds. 
Lewis came down firmly on the side of divergence. His argument is short enough 
to quote in full (here Lewis is using ‘branching’ in such a way that it entails 
overlap): 
 
The trouble with branching exactly is that it conflicts with our 
ordinary presupposition that we have a single future. If two futures 
are equally mine, one with a sea fight tomorrow and one without, it is 
nonsense to wonder which way it will be – it will be both ways – and 
yet I do wonder. The theory of branching suits those who think this 
wondering is nonsense. Or those who think the wondering makes sense 
only if reconstrued: you have leave to wonder about the sea fight, 
provided that really you wonder not about what tomorrow will bring 
but about what today predetermines. But a modal realist who thinks 
in the ordinary way that it makes sense to wonder about what the 
future will bring, and who distinguishes this from wondering about 
what is already predetermined, will reject branching in favour of 
divergence.  
Lewis [1986] p.207-8 
 
It is tempting to put the argument extremely succinctly, as follows. If 
there are multiple futures, then the expression ‘the future’ suffers from 
presupposition failure. Definite descriptions presuppose uniqueness, but this 
presupposition is false in the presence of overlapping worlds. As a result, no 
11 
 
sentences which contain the definite description ‘the future’ are true; but this is 
absurd, so there cannot be multiple futures. 
 
This quick version of the argument is a little too quick, and there are 
ways for branching-time theorists to resist it. Belnap denies that ‘the future’ is a 
referring expression at all, and instead suggests that it should be given a 
‘quantificational’ reading. The idea is that ‘the future’ means something like 
‘however things turn out’ rather than meaning ‘the way in which things will turn 
out’. I will not try to assess the extent to which this response to the quick 
version of the argument succeeds, because I think the quick version fails to do 
justice to Lewis’ central point. 
 
To get clearer on how Lewis’ argument really works, it is useful to look 
at the context in which it occurs. In section 4.2 of Lewis [1986], he first argues 
against overlap of worlds as a general theory of de re representation. The main 
argument – which Lewis calls the ‘argument from accidental intrinsics’ – is that 
individuals who are parts of many worlds will have different intrinsic properties 
according to different worlds. This turns intrinsic properties into relations to 
worlds, which – Lewis claims – does too much violence to our ordinary 
conception of what it is to have an intrinsic property. 
 
The passage quoted above consists in an application of this general 
argument against overlap of possibilia to the special case of worlds which overlap 
up to some time and which branch thereafter. Consider the sea-battle which may 
take place tomorrow, and ask whether an observer-stage X who exists now is 
such that there will be a sea-battle. On the overlapping conception, there can be 
no univocal answer; X is such that there will be a sea-battle according to one 
history, but such that there will be no sea-battle according to the other history. 
Given overlap, properties like being such that there will be a sea-battle 
tomorrow are not extrinsic monadic properties; they are relations to histories. X 
is future-sea-battle-related to one history and no-future-sea-battle-related to the 
other. 
 
Lewis goes on to raise trouble for this replacement of monadic properties 
by relations to histories by considering the content of our future-directed 
attitudes. If I only have my future-directed properties relative to histories, then 
propositions about my future are likewise only true relative to histories. This 
means that there are no history-unrelativized propositions about the future to 
serve as the contents of our future-directed attitudes and illocutionary acts. 
 
Consider first uncertainty. If I endorse branching-time semantics, and 
accept both that there will be a sea-battle relative to history h1 and that there 
will be no sea-battle relative to history h2, it seems that there is nothing left for 
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me to be uncertain about. There is no future-specifying proposition with a truth-
value of which I can be ignorant. 
 
Consider next hope. Suppose as a pacifist I hate sea-battles, and hope 
that there will be no sea-battle tomorrow. What is it that I am hopeful about? 
According to branching-time semantics, relative to h1 there will definitely be a 
sea-battle and relative to h2 there will definitely not be a sea-battle. There is no 
future-specifying proposition with a truth-value about which I can have hopes. 
 
Properly understood, the Lewisian argument against overlap of worlds 
does not depend on any thesis about the reference of the expression ‘the future’. 
Rather, it depends on the thesis that we can have attitudes and perform speech 
acts with history-unrelativized future-directed propositional contents. Wondering 
whether p, and hoping that p, are normally modelled as attitudes that agents 
have to the proposition p; we make this explicit when we refer to these states as 
‘propositional attitudes’. But branching-time semantics does not deliver any 
history-unrelativized propositions that can serve as the content of propositional 
attitudes concerning the future. The branching-time theorist either must deny 
that we can coherently wonder about the future when we know the full range of 
open possibilities, or must deny that wondering about the future involves 
wondering about the truth-value of any proposition. Neither option seems much 
good. 
 
 Branching-time theorists, of course, are well aware of the Lewisian 
argument. The most prominent response to it is that of Belnap et al. [2001], who 
refer to the argument as the ‘Assertion problem’ (despite their recognition that 
‘an analogous line of thought would apply to attempts to evaluate other attitude 
and performative verbs, such as “believe,” “wonder” and “predict”.’8) Belnap et al. 
grant that future contingent sentences evaluated without relativization to a 
history-of-evaluation parameter lack a truth value, and accordingly they accept 
that no clear sense can be made of what it is to assert or to believe or to hope or 
to fear that future contingent sentences are true at the moment of utterance. 
Accordingly, they attempt to account for our future-directed thought and talk in 
pragmatic terms, without ascribing it propositional content in the usual way. 
 
 What this means is best illustrated by the example of assertion, the only 
case which Belnap et al. discuss in any detail. They propose that to assert a 
future-directed sentence which lacks a truth-value at the moment of assertion is 
to undertake later to be vindicated in histories relative to which the sentence 
would have expressed a true proposition, and later to be impugned in histories 
relative to which the sentence would have expressed a false proposition. 
Assertion of future contingent sentences is thus construed as a speech act 
                                            
8 Belnap et al. [2001], p.172. 
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directed towards future truth and falsity, rather than towards present truth and 
falsity about the future. 
 
The more general idea is this: to adopt a particular future-directed 
attitude or to make a future-directed speech act is to make a conditional 
commitment. It is to prescribe a particular range of present-directed attitudes to 
your various different possible successors. Assertions of unrelativized future 
contingents are for Belnap et al. relevantly like ascriptions of moral properties 
are for non-cognitivists: at least at the time of utterance they are not truth-apt, 
and so they can only be evaluated for various sorts of appropriateness.  
 
In at least two ways, the pragmatic account results in a loss of 
theoretical unity and simplicity. The first of these ways is that a different 
characterization is needed for each possible attitude. If to assert is to undertake 
to be either vindicated or impugned, then maybe to hope is to undertake to be 
either relieved or disappointed; to suspect is to undertake to be either confirmed 
or surprised, and to desire is to undertake to be either pleased or displeased. 
Generalizing the strategy recommended by Belnap et al., the plan is to identify, 
for each attitude one can take to future contingents, a ‘positive’ state and a 
‘negative’ state; and then to characterize the in question attitude via those 
states. 
 
This procedure raises a number of questions. It is not straightforward to 
come up with simple characterizations for all of the possible attitudes one could 
have to future contingent propositions. What about, for example, to imagine, or 
to intend? Even in the case of assertion, where candidate positive and negative 
states are explicitly provided by Belnap et al., or in the case of – for example – 
hope, where it seems relatively easy to provide such candidates, we might worry 
about whether the resulting characterizations are correct and exhaustive. 
Constructing a pragmatic analogue of what Churchland [1981] calls ‘folk 
psychology’ seems to be a highly non-trivial exercise, and it seems unwise for the 
branching-time theorist to rest the adequacy of their view on the prospects for 
providing a pragmatic theory of this sort. 
 
Even if pragmatic characterizations could be produced of all the various 
propositional attitudes as they apply to future contingent propositions, and if we 
could somehow be assured of their adequacy, it would remain the case that the 
resulting picture is complex and disunified. Belnap et al. show no inclination to 
extend their pragmatic treatment of attitudes to future contingent propositions 
to cover attitudes to propositions which are not future contingents. If we do not 
extend the treatment in this way, then it looks like we invoke a dualism in our 
treatment of the attitudes which is not linguistically or psychologically marked. 
Hoping that your football team wins the match tomorrow does not seem to be a 
fundamentally different sort of thing from hoping that they won the match 
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yesterday, in a circumstance where you are unaware of the result. But if we do 
extend the pragmatic treatment to propositional attitudes in general, then we 
sharply reduce the scope and power of our semantic theory. 
 
Regardless of how seriously we take these worries about their pragmatic 
solution to the Assertion problem, it is important to note that rather than 
rebutting Lewis’ main criticism, Belnap et al. have conceded the point and 
sought to soften the blow. Since according to branching-time semantics there are 
no true non-history-relativized propositions about the future, a fortiori there are 
no true non-history-relativized propositions about the future that can serve as 
the contents of our future-directed thought and talk. Belnap et al. attempt to 
show that this situation does not undermine our practice of assertion by giving it 
a special-purpose pragmatic treatment; and perhaps the treatment can be 
extended to cover certain other fragments of our future-directed thought and 
talk. However, in the next section I will argue that the pragmatic treatment 
cannot be applied to the attitude of epistemic uncertainty without serious 
consequences for the interpretation of probability.  
6. Motivating Branching-Time Semantics via Physics 
All of the groundwork is now in place to properly assess the motivations 
for combining EQM with branching-time semantics. In this section I will first 
argue that the physics of EQM provides only weak and defeasible support for an 
overlapping ontology of worlds. I will then argue that the overlapping ontology, 
because it does not allow for future-directed attitudes to have straightforward 
propositional content, prevents us from ascribing objective probabilities to 
propositions about the future. Since probabilities are crucial both to the 
predictions of quantum mechanics and to the evidence which supports it, this 
provides strong grounds for preferring diverging EQM to overlapping EQM. 
Branching-time semantics then drops out of the Everettian picture altogether. 
 
The motivation for combining EQM with branching-time semantics is 
set forth clearly by Bacciagaluppi [2002], by Wallace [2005], by Saunders and 
Wallace [2008] and by Belnap and Müller [2010]; it rests on the reading of EQM 
as a theory with an ontology of overlapping worlds, and on the (quite 
reasonable) assumption that a semantic theory should not posit semantic 
distinctions without a metaphysical difference9. I have no quarrel with this latter 
assumption, but I reject the premise that EQM must be read as a theory with an 
overlapping ontology. As I argued in section 4, both diverging and overlapping 
interpretations of the consistent histories formalism are possible, and the physics 
itself does not distinguish between them. 
 
                                            
9 This is essentially the assumption, in the terminology of Bigelow [1988], that 
truth depends on being. 
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It would be possible to accept that a diverging interpretation of the 
consistent histories formalism is available, but to nevertheless maintain that the 
physics provides us with reason to prefer overlap. That is, it could be claimed 
that while divergence is compatible with EQM, it fails to do justice to the spirit 
of the theory. Simon Saunders has used this style of argument in a number of 
papers from the 1990s. Here is one example: 
 
The universal state, with its unitary evolution, is a single object in its 
own right. We may take various cross-sections through this object, 
and consider relations among various of its parts, but the totality of 
cross-sections and relations does not exist as something over and 
above the original. I take it that this is the guiding inspiration of the 
relational approach, and the core concept of the physics. 
Saunders [2010] 
 
Saunders no longer takes this ‘guiding inspiration’ to be tension with 
divergence, since diverging worlds – despite having no mereological overlap – can 
be combined via quantum superposition to recover the universal state. In 
Saunders [2010], he argues that divergence is the more serviceable metaphysics, 
the one which best meshes ordinary language and thought with the mathematics 
of quantum mechanics, and that it is, ipso facto, the correct metaphysics10: 
 
...the suspicion is that whether worlds in EQM diverge or overlap is 
underdetermined by the mathematics. One can use either picture; they 
are better or worse adapted to different purposes. If so, it is pretty 
clear which is the right one for making sense of [future-directed] 
uncertainty. 
Saunders [2010] 
 
 Saunders diagnoses the presumption of overlap as historical accident, 
deriving from Everett’s use of the term ‘branching’ to set out his theory and 
from the prevalence of the Schrödinger picture in conceptual discussions11. It is 
                                            
10 Saunders in this paper goes to some lengths to show that no hidden inconsistency 
lurks in the diverging picture. In particular, he sets out a mereology for Heisenberg-
picture vectors which is such that macroscopic objects represented by orthogonal 
vectors are merologically non-overlapping. This account is valuable as an existence-
proof; though whether we are inclined to adopt Saunders’ particular mereological 
picture will depend on what we say about the nature of the representation relation 
between Heisenberg-picture vectors and macroscopic objects. If a one-one 
correspondence is assumed, then Saunders’s vector mereology is apt; if instead we 
allow that vectors correspond one-many to macroscopic objects then other, simpler 
vector mereologies may be apt. Whether the needed ideological structure is best 
located in the parthood relation or in the representation relation is a metaphysical 
question that will here be left open; either of these options can underwrite a 
diverging metaphysics of Everett worlds.  
11 Saunders [2010], p.200. 
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plausible that considerations of parsimony have also played a role. There is after 
all a real sense in which overlap is more ontologically minimal than divergence – 
it involves fewer property-instantiations in total12. But while I recognise the 
appeal of the overlapping conception, its extra parsimony must be offset against 
the difficulties that it generates for thought and talk about the future. 
 
 It should be clear that Lewis’ argument against overlap applies to the 
worlds of EQM in exactly the same way as it applies to the worlds of Lewisian 
modal realism. In each case both a diverging metaphysic and an overlapping 
metaphysic are possible; in each case ordinary thought and talk about the future 
appears to conflict with the overlapping metaphysic. It is therefore surprising 
that while Lewis’ argument has been highly influential in the metaphysics of 
modality, it has until recently had little impact on the debate over EQM. 
 
In fact, I think the Lewisian argument is potentially even more 
damaging to overlapping EQM than it is to overlapping modal realism, because 
of the centrality of questions about objective probability to quantum mechanics. 
Many critics of EQM, including Loewer [1996] and Price [2010], have focused 
their objections around the ‘Incoherence problem’ described in section 2: if we 
know for certain that all possible outcomes will be realized, how can we 
coherently assign probabilities to outcomes? The problem is often put in terms of 
the unavailability of a notion of ‘objective uncertainty’. For an agent who knows 
that quantum mechanics is correct, and who knows the complete current 
quantum state, what is there left to be uncertain about? And if there is nothing 
to be uncertain about, what room is there for probabilities other than 1 or 0? 
 
At the root of the Incoherence problem is the requirement that objective 
probabilities should attach to propositions. The probability of some future 
outcome is the probability of the proposition that the outcome will occur; hence, 
assigning probabilities to a range of distinct future outcomes requires assigning 
probabilities to a range of mutually exclusive propositions about the future. But 
given an overlapping ontology, there are no appropriate mutually exclusive 
propositions about the future. To paraphrase Lewis, given overlapping EQM it is 
nonsense to wonder which outcome of a measurement will occur – both outcomes 
will occur. Consequently, it is nonsensical to assign objective probabilities other 
than 1 to either outcome. 
 
When about to perform a spin measurement, I cannot assign a 50% 
probability to seeing spin-up and a 50% probability to seeing spin-down: I am 
both in a spin-up world and in a spin-down world, so I am certain to see spin-up 
                                            
12 The kind of parsimony in question is quantitative parsimony: see Nolan [1997] 
for a clear discussion. David Lewis famously recognised no presumption whatsoever 
in favour of quantitative parsimony: see Lewis [1973], p.87. 
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and I am certain to see spin-down. The future-directed attitudes which Lewis 
argues are unavailable in an overlapping ontology, and which Belnap et al. 
concede cannot be represented in the branching-time framework, seem to be 
indispensable for grounding objective probability in the Everettian picture. 
 
Lewis’ own response to the problems that overlap generates for future-
directed attitudes is to reject overlap and to embrace divergence in the context 
of modal realism. I propose the same response in the context of EQM. If we 
adopt a diverging version of EQM, then objective uncertainty can be thought of 
as self-locating uncertainty: uncertainty about which world we are a part of. 
Such uncertainty will persist even when we know the laws of nature and the 
quantum state in complete detail: knowledge of the state guarantees that there 
are many Everett worlds which are indiscernible from ours up to the present 
time and which have different futures, and we have no way of knowing which of 
these worlds we are in. 
 
The interpretation of objective uncertainty as self-locating uncertainty is 
unavailable given an overlapping ontology. If I am currently located in a history 
segment which is both part of a spin-up world and part of a spin-down world, 
then I know all there is to know about my location. There is no further self-
locating fact of which I am uncertain that could comprise a subject-matter for 
objective probabilities. 
 
We might try to recover an indexical notion of objective uncertainty by 
combining overlap with a particular metaphysics of personal identity13. The trick 
would be to think of self-location not as a matter of the location of an 
instantaneous time-slice, or stage, but instead as a matter of the location of a 
whole spatio-temporal continuant. If such a continuant performs an experiment, 
then it overlaps either a spin-up outcome or a spin-down outcome, but not both. 
However, Wilson [2010] argues that this proposal breaks down when it is applied 
to objective uncertainty about events which occur after our own deaths: as a 
result, it is not capable of grounding probabilities for future outcomes in full 
generality.  
 
Once we abandon overlap for divergence, then no macroscopic object or 
event is part of more than one world, and so no analogous problem arises for the 
self-locating conception of objective uncertainty. When we talk about the future, 
on the diverging picture, we are talking about the future of our world only. 
There are true propositions, not relativized to any history, about our world’s 
future; and it is these which can provide propositional contents for our attitudes 
                                            
13 Although aspects of the discussion in Saunders and Wallace [2008] suggest that 
this is the proposal they have in mind, in fact the main proposal made in that paper 
is more complex; it identifies macroscopic objects with ordered pairs of parts of 
worlds and whole worlds. See Wilson [2010] for discussion. 
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and for our illocutionary acts. Given divergence, we can treat objective 
uncertainty as indexical uncertainty in full generality, without having to commit 
to any contentious metaphysics of personal identity. 
 
Divergence does not solve the incoherence problem in EQM all by itself. 
Other fragments of theory – in particular, appropriate treatments of actuality 
(as indexical) and of chance-bearing propositions (as sets of worlds) – are also 
required. And even when the Incoherence problem has been successfully 
addressed, the Quantitative problem and the Epistemic problem may still 
continue to trouble us. In Wilson [forthcoming] I develop a more detailed 
account of objective probability in diverging EQM. Here I have only aimed to 
establish that overlap clashes with the indexical conception of objective 
uncertainty in a way in which divergence does not.  
 
As the metaphysics of EQM is underdetermined by the physics, we are 
free to adopt whichever metaphysics is of most help in making sense of objective 
probability. Although an overlapping metaphysic may in some sense be the 
simpler or more parsimonious way of reading ontological conclusions off from the 
consistent histories formalism, in my view this additional parsimony is 
outweighed by the problems that overlap generates for objective probability. 
And if Everettians reject overlap, they have no need for branching-time 
semantics. 
7. Motivating Branching-Time Semantics via Common 
Sense 
Of course, branching-time semantics has not historically been motivated 
by any particular piece of physics. Its pioneers, in particular Saul Kripke and 
Arthur Prior, seem to have been motivated to capture something about our 
position as agents with ineliminably limited capacities for accessing and 
processing information, and hence with ineliminably limited capabilities for 
predicting the future. This is parlayed into the thought that indeterminism is a 
real phenomenon, and that our metaphysics must incorporate it as a basic 
element. Belnap et al. sum up their motivation for developing branching-time 
semantics as follows: 
 
...we try never to forget the central constraining thought: There is 
neither action nor agency nor doings without real choices, choices that 
find their place not merely in the agent’s mind, but within the 
(indeterminist) causal order of our world. To see to it that Q, an agent 
must make a real choice among objectively incompatible future 
alternatives. When we say that an event may have many possible but 
incompatible outcomes, we thereby come down on the side of “hard” 
indeterminism as against determinism. 
Belnap et al. [2001] p. xi 
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I would reconstruct this line of thought as follows. 
 
(A) It is a platitude about human beings and our place in the world that 
we make choices. 
(B) The choices we make are real choices; they are not illusory. 
(C) It is analytic of the notion of a real choice that there be multiple 
genuinely possible and objectively incompatible future alternatives 
amongst which the choice distinguishes. 
(D) The existence of genuinely possible and objectively incompatible 
future alternatives requires that the present moment be part of 
multiple distinct histories.  
(E) In a world in which the present moment is part of multiple distinct 
histories, branching-time semantics is the only semantic theory 
which avoids drawing distinctions without a difference, while still 
being expressively adequate. 
 
The place where I want to object to this line of thought is premise (D). 
Compatibilists about alternative possibilities will maintain that all that is needed 
for there to presently be genuine alternative possibilities is for there to presently 
be possibilities which match the segment of the actual world up to the present 
time, but which differ from it afterwards. Belnap et al. refer to this sort of 
compatibilist picture as soft indeterminism, and contrast it unfavourably with 
their own hard indeterminism. But it is not clear in what the hardness of their 
position consists, or why we should care about this distinction, or why we should 
take common sense to support hard indeterminism over soft indeterminism. 
 
One way to sharpen up this latter concern is to cast it as an 
indiscriminability argument. If we grant (D), then we lose any reason to believe 
(B). Branching-time theorists typically allow for determinism as at least a logical 
possibility, and allow that there could be a deterministic world with an initial 
segment which exactly duplicates the segment of history that the branching-time 
theorist takes to correspond to actual past history. Agents located in this 
deterministic world would have exactly the same common-sense intuitions, and 
exactly the same phenomenology, as agents in the actual world; but their 
conclusions that their own world was hard-indeterministic would be false. This, 
it might be argued, casts doubt on the motivation from ‘common sense’ for 
believing that the actual world is hard-indeterministic. 
 
The problem with indiscriminability arguments of this sort is that they 
can too easily be assimilated to sceptical arguments more generally. If a 
deceiving demon is at least a logical possibility, then parity of reasoning with the 
previous argument casts doubt on the conclusion that an external world exists 
and is much like we take it to be. So perhaps the kind of indiscriminability 
argument just given need worry the hard-indeterminist. 
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 The analogy between hard-indeterminism-scepticism and external-
world-scepticism is not, of course, precise. Perhaps some disanalogy between the 
cases can be used to uphold hard-indeterminism-scepticism without ushering in 
external-world-scepticism. A plausible diagnosis is that the external-world realist 
has an account of how we gain reliable information about the external world if 
all goes well – sense perception – while the branching-time theorist who 
embraces hard indeterminism can give no equivalent account of how we gain 
reliable information about other branches. But even when bolstered by this 
diagnosis, it is not clear that the indiscriminability argument against hard 
indeterminism is compelling. 
 
There is, however, a more powerful argument in the vicinity. The case 
against hard indeterminism is best posed not as an epistemological argument – 
that, were hard indeterminism correct, we could not know that it was correct – 
but as a methodological argument – that it could never be rational to posit hard 
indeterminism rather than soft indeterminism. This methodological argument 
combines the premise that a theory incorporating hard indeterminism is more 
complex than a theory incorporating soft indeterminism with the premise that 
hard indeterminism provides no additional explanatory power, and concludes 
that we cannot have any good reason to believe in hard indeterminism. 
 
In contrasting epistemological arguments against the knowability of 
some posited ingredient of a metaphysical worldview with methodological 
arguments against positing that ingredient, I follow John Hawthorne (Hawthorne 
[2002]). With Hawthorne, I take the epistemological style of argument to be 
generally inconclusive but the methodological style of argument to be potentially 
compelling. 
 
The final reason I want to adduce for rejecting the motivation from 
common-sense for branching-time semantics is that it is in tension with the 
motivation from the physics discussed in section 6. The claim that EQM fits 
naturally with branching-time semantics could only provide a reason to adopt 
branching time for those who aspire to let physical theory guide metaphysical 
theory. But it is a distinctive feature of this ‘naturalistic’ methodology that our 
common-sense intuitions about the world are treated as only a very weak and 
defeasible source of evidence in metaphysics. Conversely, those practitioners of 
‘analytic metaphysics’ who regard the contingencies of actual physics as 
irrelevant to their concerns will be indifferent to any argument from EQM to the 
correctness of branching-time semantics. The motivation from physics and the 
motivation for common-sense are not then, as we might have thought, 
complementary; to the extent that we are moved by one, we are likely to be 
unmoved by the other.  
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8. Conclusion 
The project of accounting for language use in Everett worlds looks like a 
paradigmatic application for branching-time semantics; but appearances are 
deceptive. A diverging version of EQM can treat the semantics of future 
contingent propositions as continuous with the semantics of other descriptive 
propositions, can preserve a bivalent classical logic in full generality, and can 
help to ground a non-eliminative conception of objective probabilities. If this is 
correct, then the ‘parallel worlds’ metaphor is vindicated as an intuitive gloss on 
EQM, and Everettians are better off without branching time 
 
This conclusion casts doubt on whether there could be any good 
motivation for adopting branching time semantics. My own view is that 
branching-time theorists have not done enough to persuade us that 
indeterminism is the sort of phenomenon which is best treated by adding 
complications to classical logic and semantics14.  
                                            
14 An early version of this paper was presented at the BIRTHA Branching Time 
and Indeterminacy Conference held at the University of Bristol in August 2010. It 
has benefited from helpful conversations with Andrew Bacon, Cian Dorr, Antony 
Eagle, Rohan French, Toby Handfield, John Hawthorne, Alex Malpass, Thomas 
Mller, Laurie Paul, David Wallace and Robert Williams, and from the comments of 
two anonymous referees. Particular thanks to Simon Saunders and to Nuel Belnap 
for providing extensive comments on multiple drafts, and for enthusiasm and 
encouragement. 
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